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DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN APPEALS OF
CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEAL: A REVIEW OF
DECISIONS AND EXAMINATION OF THE
LEGAL LANDSCAPE FROM 2016 – 2020∗.
Martin Novak
National Institute of Justice
martin.novak@usdoj.gov

ABSTRACT
This study is a follow-up to Digital Evidence in Criminal Cases before the U.S. Courts of
Appeal: Trends and Issues for Consideration – 2010 to 2015. The current study examines
appeals of criminal cases before the United States Courts of Appeal from January 2016
through August 2020, where one or more appeal claims were related to digital evidence.
The purpose of this research was to determine if the legal landscape has changed since
2015; examine the most relevant legal issues related to digital evidence; and analyze how
precedential cases may have affected digital forensics as evidence.
Keywords: Digital Evidence, Compelled Decryption, Geo-Location, Network Investigative
Technique, Border Searches, U.S. Courts of Appeal

1.

INTRODUCTION

Results from the study Digital Evidence in
Criminal Cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeal: Trends and Issues for Consideration
(2010 – 2015)1 showed that the majority of
appeals involving digital evidence included
in the study were for offenses related to child
pornography – over 90%. The remaining ten
percent were offenses related to narcotics, sex
∗

PERIOD COVERED INCLUDES JANUARY
2016 – AUGUST 2020.
1
Martin Novak, "Digital Evidence in Criminal
Cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeal: Trends
and Issues for Consideration," Journal of Digital
Forensics, Security and Law 14, no. 4 (April 2020),
http://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol14/iss4/3.
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crimes, weapons, violent crimes, and white
collar crimes. Similarly, the majority of digital evidence involved came from the hard
drives of suspect’s computers or laptops –
over 85%. The remaining evidence was from
cell phones, GPS tracking devices, and digital
cameras.
New types of digital technologies have
emerged since 2015, introducing new challenges for investigators in capturing and acquiring digital evidence. We live in a world
that is more connected to the Internet than
ever before. We connect through our computers, our smartphones, and wearable devices –
The number of smartphone users worldwide
Page 1
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since 2017 has jumped from 2.9 billion to 3.5
billion in 2020.2
Border crossings create an interesting use
case scenario for the searching and seizing
of electronic devices. On a typical day in
2019, approximately 1,124,000 people entered
through the United States’ borders by plane,
automobile, ship, and on foot.3 With recent
estimates stating that 44.87% of people in the
world own a smartphone, 4 then over 500,000
people entering the United States every day
likely have a smartphone.
The duties of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency include stemming the flow
of illegal drugs and other contraband, including digital contraband. That contraband may
contain evidence of criminal activity, such as
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and possession of child pornography. Determining
which of those are likely to possess some form
of digital contraband is difficult enough. Further deducing which of those to search is even
more daunting.
From marketplaces specializing in the sale
and distribution of controlled substances, to
a proliferation of child pornography, the Dark
Net provides a host of potential criminal activity. The encrypted nature of TOR, the perceived anonymity it provides, and the cryptocurrency used for illicit transactions create
a host of barriers for law enforcement to investigate crimes committed on the Dark Net.
2

Statista, "Number of Smartphone Users
from 2016 to 2021," Statista, last modified
November 2020, accessed November 19, 2020,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/
number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/.
3
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, "On a Typical
Day in Fiscal Year 2019," U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Agency, last modified April 15, 2020, accessed November 19, 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2019.
4
Ash Turner, "Number Of Smartphone Mobile
Phone Users Worldwide," Bank My Cell (blog),
entry posted November 2020, accessed November 19, 2020, https://www.bankmycell.com/blog/
how-many-phones-are-in-the-world.
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Nearly every one of these investigations involves the acquisition and analysis of digital
evidence.
A recent success for law enforcement was
the FBI’s Operation Pacifier, an investigation
of Playpen, a Dark Net child pornography
sharing web site. The results for Operation
Pacifier were staggering. In the United States
alone, there were 350 arrests and 76 successful
prosecutions. Internationally, 296 victims
of abuse were rescued or identified, along
with 548 arrests, based on the intelligence
gathered through Operation Pacifier.5 While
this was all very good news for the criminal
justice community, the sobering reality is that
similar sites continue to occupy corners of the
dark net.
The use of end-to-end encryption in communication and the full-disk encryption of
mobile devices place sometimes impenetrable
roadblocks for law enforcement lawful access
to communications and data. According to
one report, if Apple and Google fully implement full disk encryption, 99 percent of
smartphones in the world may become inaccessible.6 This creates a situation where even
with a valid search warrant, law enforcement
is often unable to acquire evidence that they
are legally entitled to obtain.

1.1

Structure

In an effort to address these challenges, the
goals of the current study are twofold: It first
reviews appeals in criminal cases before the
United States Courts of Appeal relating to
digital evidence from 2016 – 2020. Second is a
review of the jurisprudence affecting decisions
5

"’Playpen’ Creator Sentenced to 30 Years,"
news release, May 5, 2017, accessed November
26, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/
playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years.
6
James A. Lewis, Denise E. Zheng, and William A.
Carter, The Effect of Encryption on Lawful Access to
Communications and Data (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic International Studies, 2017), iv.
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made in appeals involving some aspect of
digital evidence across the legal landscape.
Section two reviews appeals of criminal
cases before the United States Courts of Appeal from 2016 to August 2020 and presents
the findings and discussion. Section three
examines the jurisprudence related to digital
evidence, including the associated legal issues
affected, constitutional rights implicated, and
current scholarly opinion on these matters.
Section four discusses the limitations of this
study, while section five presents the study’s
conclusions.

2. APPEALS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
BEFORE THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF
APPEAL (2016 – 2020)
This section is a review of appeals of criminal cases before the United States Courts of
Appeal from 2016 to August 2020 involving
digital evidence. The two main goals of the
review were to explore how digital evidence
has changed since 2015, and examine how
digital evidence has withstood challenges on
appeal since 2015.

2.1

Research Questions

A retrospective study was undertaken as a
follow on to the author’s previous research,7
seeking answers to the following questions:
• How well has digital evidence withstood
challenges on appeal?
• How frequently are decisions affirmed for
the defense?
7

See Martin Novak, "Digital Evidence in Criminal
Cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeal: Trends and
Issues for Consideration," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law 14, no. 4 (April 2020): accessed September 16, 2020, http://commons.erau.
edu/jdfsl/vol14/iss4/3.
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• What is the most frequently occurring
basis of appeal?
• What is the most common legal basis
for appeals related to some aspect of
digital evidence? The current research
sought answers to the following research
questions and compares the answers to
the author’s previous work:
• What are the most common offenses related to digital evidence?
• What are the most common types of
evidence?
Finally, this study looks at the current legal
landscape for digital evidence to understand
it may affect appeals related to digital evidence going forward.

2.2

Methodology

The following analysis is based on relevant
appeals of criminal cases before the United
States Courts of Appeal from 2016 – August
2020 involving some aspect of digital evidence.
Civil appeals were not included as part of this
study.
2.2.1

Data and Search Terms

Data for this project was drawn from appeals of criminal cases that were affirmed or
reversed by the United States Courts of Appeal for the period 2015 – 2020. Cases were
identified via LexisNexis, using the following
search terms: Probable Cause, Encryption,
GPS, Geolocation, Geo-Fence, Onion Router,
Wearables, Internet of Things, Text Message,
Cryptocurrency, Network Investigative Tool
(NIT), Particularity, Cell Phone, Metadata,
Digital Evidence, Dark Web, ECPA, Social
Media, CSLI, and Child Pornography.8
8

Search terms in the previous study included Computer, Computer Forensics, Chat Log, Electronic Evidence, Cell Phone, Sexting, iPhone, Child Pornography, Digital Evidence, Computer Investigation, GPS,
and Encryption.
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2.3

Results and Discussion

The search terms used identified 112 appeals
where the legal issues involved digital evidence in appeals of criminal cases before the
United States Courts of Appeal between 2016
and 2020. Those appeals resulted in 108
judgments (96.43%) that were affirmed or
reversed for the government.9 This success
rate is even better than the general success
rate for the government for all criminal cases
heard before the U.S. Courts of Appeal for
the same time period – 90.9%.10 However,
it should be noted that many factors are in
play in the appeals of criminal cases, including the type of crime, type of harm inflicted,
and sentence imposed by District Court.
2.3.1

Decisions Affirmed for the
Defense

Four appeals were affirmed for the defense,
and zero appeals were reversed for the defense.
Of those appeals, two were based on probable
cause, one on relevancy, and one on scientific
merit.
2.3.2

Most Frequently Occurring
Bases of Appeal

There were 79 appeals based on Probable
Cause, as the most frequently occurring basis
for appeal. There were 15 appeals based on
Sufficiency of Evidence, eight appeals based
on Scientific Merit, five based on Probative
Value. Finally, a combined five appeals were
based on Relevancy or Authenticity. No ap9

Affirmed means that the court of appeals has
concluded that the lower court decision is correct and
will stand as rendered by the lower court. Reversed
is the act of a court setting aside the decision of a
lower court (often accompanied by a remand to the
lower court for further proceedings)
10
A subsequent search of Lexis Nexis showed that
there was no subsequent history for any of the cases
included in this study. In several instances US
Supreme Court certiorari was denied, but the outcomes for all appeals were unchanged.
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peals based on Hearsay or Best Evidence were
identified as a basis of appeal in this study.
2.3.3

Offenses Related to Digital
Evidence

The offenses associated with these appeals
ran the breadth of criminal activity. There
were 44 offenses related to child pornography, including production, possession, and
distribution were the most frequently occurring basis of appeal. There were 34 narcotics
related offenses, including distribution and
possession. There were 17 violent offenses,
including murder, manslaughter, and cyberstalking. There were nine sex offenses, including enticement, exploitation, and prostitution. Additionally, there were five white collar offenses, including fraud and tax evasion.
Finally, there were three offenses related to
illegal weapons possession and distribution.
Table 1 is a comparison between the two
time periods, showing that most offenses are
still related to child pornography for the period 2016 – 2020. There were considerably
more offenses related to narcotics, violent
crimes, and sex crimes. White collar offenses
and weapons offenses did not change appreciably.11
2.3.4

Types of Evidence Comparison

In figure 2, cell phones were the most numerous type or piece of evidence at 52, while
evidence from IP-addresses came in next at
twenty-nine. The third most numerous piece
of evidence was computers at 20, with Bit11

Narcotics-related offenses included trafficking,
possession, and production. Child pornography offenses included possession, production, and distribution. Violent crime offenses included homicide,
manslaughter, extortion, armed robbery, cyberstalking, arson, kidnapping, and terrorism. Sex crimes
included enticement, exploitation, and sex trafficking. White collar crimes included tax evasion, and
obstruction of justice,

© 2022 JDFSL
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Offenses
Child Pornography
Narcotics
Violent Crimes
Sex Crimes
White Collar
Weapons
Totals

2010-2015
132
5
1
2
5
1
146

2016-2020
44
34
17
9
5
3
112

Table 1. Comparison of Offenses
Evidence
2010-2015 2016-2020
Cell Phone
5
51
IP Address
29
12
Computer
125
20
GPS
4
9
Bitcoin
3
External Media
11
Digital Camera
1
Totals
146
112
Table 2. Comparison of evidence types

coin and GPS devices combining for 13 pieces
of evidence.
In comparing the types of digital evidence
from the first study to the current one, it is
interesting to note that the addition of IPaddresses as evidence in the current study,
while no occurrences of this type of evidence
appeared in the study that covered 2010 –
2015. Also, cell phones have become the dominant type of evidence seen in these appeals.13
This will likely continue to be the case as our
society becomes more mobile and dependent
upon these types of devices.

3.

LEGAL LANDSCAPE

This section is a review of the jurisprudence
affecting decisions made in appeals involving
some aspect of digital evidence across the
legal landscape. Four areas of jurisprudence
13

The category cell phone included text based cellular phones and smart phones.
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related to digital evidence have come to the
forefront of the legal landscape since 2015 –
Border Searches of Electronic Devices, Compelled Decryption of Digital Devices, Network
Investigative Technique (NIT) Warrants, and
Geo-fence Warrants. For each of these theories of law, the associated legal issues affected
and constitutional rights implicated are examined. Note that the cases cited in this
section are not necessarily part of the cases
reviewed included in the review of appeals
that were part of this study. Rather, they
address the development of the jurisprudence
over time for each area of the legal landscape.

3.1

Border Searches of
Electronic Devices

The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
describing the place to be searched with particularity, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two centuries of jurisprudence have delineated what the founding fathers meant by the
terms unreasonable, particularity, and probable cause. Along those same lines has been
the development of the doctrine of the Border
Search Exception, where searches conducted
at our nation’s borders do not require probable cause. Before delving into the Border
Search Exception, we should be clear about
the difference between the terms "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause." Reasonable
suspicion is "an objectively justifiable suspicion that is based on specific facts or circumstances that justifies stopping and sometimes
searching (as by frisking) a person thought
Page 5
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to be involved in criminal activity at the
time."14
For a more invasive search or to obtain an
arrest warrant, probable cause is required.
Probable cause is "sufficient reason based
upon known facts to believe a crime has been
committed or that certain property is connected with a crime."15
The Border Search Exception doctrine has
seen its own refinement over time as circumstances and situations have required it to.
In 1971, Customs agents seized illicit photos
from Milton Luros at Los Angeles International Airport. Luros argued that the search
was unreasonable because there was no predicate probable cause to conduct the search.
Ruling in favor of the government, the
Supreme Court declared, "A port of entry
is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let
alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is
discovered during such a search. Customs officials characteristically inspect luggage, and
their power to do so is not questioned in this
case; it is an old practice and is intimately
associated with excluding illegal articles from
the country."16
In a similar case two years later, in a case
involving reels of film containing pornography,
the Supreme Court affirmed that "Import
restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different

14

Thomson Reuters, "Reasonable Suspicion," FindLaw Legal Dictionary, last modified 2020, accessed
October 19,2020, https://dictionary.findlaw.
com/definition/reasonable-suspicion.html.
15
Gerald Hill and Kathleen Hill, "Probable Cause,"
The People’s Law Dictionary, last modified 2020,
accessed October 19, 2020, https://dictionary.
law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1618.
16
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402
U. S. 363, 376 (1971)
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considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations."17
Finally, in a 1977 appeal involving a mail
order drug business, the Supreme Court
found that Customs Agents acted reasonably,
stating that "border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
have been considered to be ’reasonable’ by
the single fact that the person or item in
question had entered into our country from
outside. There has never been any additional
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition
that searches at our borders without probable
cause and without a warrant are nonetheless
’reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth
Amendment itself."18
While these rulings seemed to satisfy most
situations in a pen and paper world, the dawn
of the digital age has brought the question
of what constitutes a "reasonable" search of
electronic devices at the border into question.
The Supreme Court has yet to make a definitive ruling to date. Rather, the U.S Courts
of Appeal have been left to their own devices,
with the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit coming
to different conclusions.
3.1.1

Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals

On February 2, 2016, Hamza Kolsuz was
detained at Washington Dulles International
Airport while attempting to board a flight
to Turkey after federal customs agents found
firearms parts in his luggage. Kolsuz had
been part of an ongoing investigation into
arms smuggling by the Customs and Border
Protection Agency (CBP).
After arresting Hamza Kolsuz on charges
of arms smuggling, CPB agents took posses17

United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413
U. S. 123, 125 (1973)
18
United States v. Ramsey et al., 431 U.S. 606
(1977)

© 2022 JDFSL
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sion of his smartphone and subjected it to a
month-long, off-site forensic analysis, yielding a nearly 900-page report cataloging the
phone’s data. Prior to his trial, Kolsuz moved
to suppress the forensic report on his phone
by arguing that the border exception did not
apply to the search. The district court denied
this motion, finding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Kolsuz ultimately was convicted of attempting
to smuggle firearms out of the country and an
associated conspiracy charge and sentenced
to 30 months incarceration.
On appeal, Kolsuz contended that once
both he and his phone were in government
custody, the government interest in preventing contraband from crossing the border was
no longer implicated, so the border exception should no longer apply. Second, relying
chiefly on Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014) (holding that search incident to arrest
exception does not apply to searches of cell
phones), Kolsuz urged that "the privacy interest in smartphone data is so weighty that even
under the border exception, a forensic search
of a phone requires more than reasonable suspicion, and instead may be conducted only
with a warrant based on probable cause."19
The panel from the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, saying that "despite the temporal and spatial distance between the off-site analysis of the phone and
Kolsuz’s attempted departure at the airport,
the justification for the border exception is
broad enough to reach the search in this
case."20 The panel said further that "it was
reasonable for the officers who conducted the
forensic analysis of the phone to rely on the
established and uniform body of precedent allowing warrantless border searches of digital

devices that were based on at least reasonable
suspicion."21
3.1.2

Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals

On December 21, 2014, Karl Touset arrived
at the international terminal at HartsfieldJackson Atlanta International Airport, where
CBP agents detained him. Following an inspection of his luggage, the CBP agents allowed Touset to leave. However, they retained several of his electronic devices for
further examination. The subsequent forensic searches revealed child pornography on
two laptops and two external hard drives. On
January 28, 2015, following a search of his
home in Marietta, Georgia, Touset was arrested and charged with possession of child
pornography.
Prior to trial, Touset filed a motion at
an evidentiary hearing before the magistrate
judge to suppress the evidence found on his
devices seized at the border. He argued that
the search was based on a warrant that was
stale, and the CBP did not have reasonable
suspicion to conduct the search. The magistrate judge found that CBP agents had reasonable suspicion, and the warrant was not
stale because "files on a computer are less
likely than other types of contraband to disappear over time and can often be recovered
even if they are deleted."22
At trial, the district court adopted the magistrate’s ruling, finding that "that reasonable
suspicion existed for the detention and forensic search of Touset’s electronic devices."23
Touset subsequently pled guilty to possession
of child pornography and was sentenced to
120 months of imprisonment. He appealed
his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
21

19

United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 132 (4th
Cir. 2018).
20
Id, 133.
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Id, 133.
United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231
(11th Cir. 2018).
23
Id, 1231
22
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On May 23, 2018, the panel from the 11th
Circuit affirmed Touset’s sentence. Finding
that reasonable suspicion was not required
to conduct a search at the border, the panel
said that "we see no reason why the Fourth
Amendment would require suspicion for a
forensic search of an electronic device when
it imposes no such requirement for a search of
other personal property. Just as the United
States is entitled to search a fuel tank for
drugs, it is entitled to search a flash drive for
child pornography."24
The panel also found that the warrant upon
which the search was based was not stale because "the evidence that Touset made three
separate payments to the Western Union account associated with the Philippine phone
number was not stale about a year and a half
later. That evidence suggested that Touset
likely received child pornography electronically and had child pornography stored on
his electronic devices."25
In the end, it does not seem to matter
whether or not reasonable suspicion is required to conduct an invasive search of electronic devices at our nation’s borders. Any
further clarification on this point will likely
come from a United States Supreme Court
ruling, or legislation directly addressing the
search of electronic devices at the border.
3.1.3

Reasonable Suspicion or
Probable Cause?

The debate on searches of electronic devices
at the nation’s borders focuses on the legal
issues of reasonable suspicion, probable cause,
and implicates protections against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment, and seeks answers to
the following questions:
• Is a search warrant based on probable
cause required for an invasive search of
24
25

Id, 1233
Id, 1234
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electronic devices at our nation’s borders?
• Or, is reasonable suspicion sufficient to
conduct an invasive search?
Soder (2019) contends that "the reasonable
suspicion standard achieves the appropriate
balance, ensuring law-abiding travelers need
not worry about being subjected to an intrusive search of their electronic devices and
sensitive digital information."26
Referring to recent decisions in Riley and
Carpenter, Gomez (2020) argues that the
Supreme Court "should decide the circuit
split . . . and conclude that the Fourth
Amendment requires government agents to
have individualized "reasonable suspicion"
prior to conducting forensic searches of electronic devices at the border."27
Bohannon (2019) contends that probable
cause is the correct standard to apply for
searches of digital devices at the border. In
Cell Phones and the Border Search Exception, she states that "international travel . .
. should not provide a loophole to Fourth
Amendment protections and allow the government to seize personal information unrelated to the justifications embedded in general sovereignty interests at the border."28
Bohanon concludes by saying that "requiring a warrant supported by probable cause
for cell phone searches at the border is an
26

Michael Soder, "A Constitutional Limbo:
Searches of Electronic Devices at the International
Border," University of Cincinnati Law Review 88, no.
1 (2019): 270.
27
Ashley N. Gomez, "Over the Border, under What
Law: The Circuit Split over Searches of Electronic
Devices on the Border," Arizona State Law Journal
52, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 310.
28
Gina R. Bohannon, "Cell Phones and the Border Search Exception: Circuits Split over the Line
between Sovereignty and Privacy," Maryland Law
Review 78, no. 3 (2019): 599.

© 2022 JDFSL
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administrable requirement that adequately
protects privacy interests." 29
Citing the inadequacies of the Kolsuz and
Touset decisions, DeLorimer (2019) agrees
with Bohannon, saying that "although an individualized suspicion standard is a step in
the right direction, the court missed an opportunity to hold that a warrant is required
prior to conducting a forensic border search
of a cell phone. Thus, until the Supreme
Court rules on the matter, the status of international airline travelers’ digital privacy is
up in the air because of this circuit split."30
Further complicating matters with regard
to border searches of electronic devices is the
matter of routine versus non-routine searches.
A routine search is conducted when there is
no reasonable suspicion that the item being searched contains evidence of criminal or
illegal activity. This is analogous to what
we do as travelers when we go through routine airport security. A non-routine search,
on the other hand, involves "a high degree
of personal intrusion-such as a strip searchrequires "reasonable suspicion, which calls
for some particularized and objective basis
for suspecting wrongdoing."31 This would be
akin to being detained after passing through
routine airport security.
For their part, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency has clarified what it
considers a non-routine search versus a routine search of an electronic device. Issued in
2018, the agency’s guidance states that "instances in which there is reasonable suspicion
of activity in violation of the laws enforced
29

Bohannon, “Cell Phones,” 602.
30
Andrea DeLorimer, "Flying in the Face of Suspicionless Cell Phone Searches: Fourth Circuit
Grants Airline Passengers Heightened Protection
from Searches by Customs Officers," Journal of Air
Law and Commerce 84, no. 1 (2019): 134.
31
Sean O’Grady, "All Watched over by Machines of
Loving Grace: Border Searches of Electronic Devices
in the Digital Age," Fordham Law Review 87, no. 5
(April 2019): 2265.
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or administered by CBP . . an Officer may
perform an advanced search of an electronic
device." 32
The guidance goes on to describe an advanced (non-routine) search as "any search
in which an Officer connects external equipment, through a wired or wireless connection,
to an electronic device not merely to gain
access to the device, but to review, copy, and
analyze its contents."33
Meade (2020) contends that all forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border
are non-routine and that the Supreme Court
should "require a warrant supported by probable cause of criminality before searching electronics seized at the border." 34 O’Grady
(2019) concludes this discussion by saying
that it "seems increasingly likely that the
Supreme Court will need to resolve how the
border search exception applies to government searches of electronic devices."35

3.2

Compelled Decryption of
Digital Devices

Today, the majority of Americans own a cell
phone. According to Pew Research, 96% own
a cell phone, and of those, 81% own a smartphone. A smartphone’s capability of locking
with an alphanumeric code, or biometric such
as a fingerprint, eye scan, facial recognition
is central to the discussion of compelled decryption.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects a witness from being
compelled to give self-incriminating testi32

Kevin McAleenan, Border Search of Electronic
Devices, publication no. 3340-049A (Washington,
DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2018),
4-5.
33
McAleenan, Border Search, 4-5.
34
Chloe Meade, "The Border Search Exception in
the Modern Era: An Exploration of Tensions between
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Circuits,"
Boston University Journal of Science and Technology
Law 26, no. 1 (2020): 194.
35
O’Grady, "All Watched," 2284
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mony. Two terms from jurisprudence define
the discussion concerning compelled decryption – Testimonial and Non-Testimonial. If
a witness or suspect is forced to produce the
"contents of one’s own mind," it is considered
testimonial and therefore protected by the
Fifth Amendment.
If on the other hand, what the witness or
suspect is forced to produce is a foregone
conclusion, such as a fingerprint, then it is
considered non-testimonial and not protected
by the Fifth Amendment. To claim a foregone conclusion, "the government must be
able to establish its prior knowledge of the
existence, possession, and authenticity of the
requested documents with "reasonable particularity.”"36
Recent court rulings demonstrate that
there is a divergence of opinion of when compelling decryption becomes testimonial. In
United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum)37 , 670 F.3d 1335 (11th
Cir. 2012), the 11th circuit held that the
requirement "to use a decryption password
is most certainly more akin to requiring the
production of a combination because both
demand the use of the contents of the mind,
and the production is accompanied by . . .
implied factual statements . . . could prove
to be incriminatory." 38 In this instance, producing a password was considered testimonial. In State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870;
(MN, 2018), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota ruled that ordering the "appellant to
provide a fingerprint to unlock a seized cell36

Richard M. Thompson, II and Chris Jaikaran,
Encryption: Selected Legal Issues, issue brief no.
R44407 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2016), 14.
37
A subpoena duces tecum requires the witness
to produce a document or documents pertinent to a
proceeding. From the Latin duces tecum, meaning
"you shall bring with you".
38
United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir.
2012).

Page 10

phone did not violate his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination because
of the compelled act as not a testimonial communication."39 On this occasion, providing a
fingerprint was considered non-testimonial.
Recently, in re Search of a Residence in
Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal.
2019), the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California declared
that a "finger or thumb scan used to unlock
a device indicates that the device belongs
to a particular individual. In other words,
the act concedes that the phone was in the
possession and control of the suspect, and authenticates ownership or access to the phone
and all of its digital contents."40 In this case,
providing a fingerprint was considered testimonial. Clearly, this ruling is counter to
State v. Diamond, so the ultimate determination on compelled decryption has yet to
be made. In all likelihood, it will be left to
the United States Supreme Court to determine the rules for compelling decryption of
electronic devices.
3.2.1

The Contents of One’s Own
Mind or a Foregone
Conclusion?

The discussion among scholars on the compelled decryption of digital devices centers
around the following questions:
• Does the act of compulsion force a suspect or witness to reveal the contents of
his mind, making the statement testimonial?
• Or, is the act of compulsion merely a
foregone conclusion, rendering the statement non-testimonial?
39

US Supreme Court certiorari denied by Diamond
v. Minnesota, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3071 (U.S. 2018).
40
In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F.
Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
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• In either scenario, can the witness or suspect claim Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination?
Scholars like Metz (2019) contend that
protection from compulsion in the digital
age is essential to protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination provided by the
Fifth Amendment. Metz argues that "allowing authorities to force the production of a
device and its contents via the compulsion of
biometric data brushes dangerously close to
an inquisitorial system of justice."41
Other scholars, like Reitinger (2019) concur, stating that "compelled device unlock based on a fingerprint or facial scan
should be deemed to infringe upon the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against selfincrimination."42
Kerr (2019) compares the search of a digital device with encryption to the traditional
search of a dwelling. With a valid search
warrant, officers may conduct a search of the
entirety of the dwelling, detain any persons
in the dwelling, and search any place in the
dwelling where they may find evidence as
particularized in the search warrant. In contrast, digital devices, particularly cell phones,
are encrypted creating as Kerr describes it
inserting "a door in front of many forms of
electronic treasure."43
According to Kerr, the answer to greater
access to information on cell phones is not
a Fifth Amendment problem. Although the
Fourth Amendment may protect the contents

of the cell phone, "Proof of ability to enter
in the password disarms the privilege against
self-incrimination by rendering the testimonial aspect of production-knowledge of the
password-a foregone conclusion."44
Contending that compelled decryption
raises Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues,
Chase (2020) says that "the courts could
ensure that individual rights, especially in
regard to digital devices and the biometric
locks that are so commonly used with them,
are fundamentally protected at a time when
technology could allow government power to
grow exponentially."45 He argues this would
not end law enforcement’s ability to find evidence on digital devices. Instead, Chase
says it would mean "that law enforcement
must consider the conditions required for two
amendments instead of one.."46
Suggesting that we should consider the
right to go dark, Gray (2019) states that
"recognizing a right to go dark would guarantee our authority to determine whether our
devices can testify against us. If that were the
law, then a derivative right to go dark would
guarantee that nothing our devices know as
a consequence of being our devices could ever
be used against us unless we affirmatively
waived."47
While Gray says that there is a case to be
made for a limited right to go dark for devices covered by doctor-patient privileges or
medical monitoring devices subject to HIPAA
privacy laws, "there does not seem to be good
grounds for a general right to go dark when it

41

Howard Metz, "Your Device Is Disabled: How
and Why Compulsion of Biometrics to Unlock Devices Should Be Protected by the Fifth Amendment
Privilege," Valparaiso University Law Review 53, no.
2 (Winter 2019): 466.
42
Nathan Reitinger, "Faces and Fingers: Authentication," Journal of High Technology Law 20, no. 1
(2020): 62.
43
Orin S. Kerr, "Compelled Decryption and the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination," Texas Law Review 97, no. 4 (March 2019): 795.
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comes to personal electronic devices adopted
by users on their own initiative."48

3.3 Network Investigative
Technique (NIT) Warrants
The Particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment specifies that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized
makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
The Good Faith Exception is an advancement in exclusionary rule, promulgated in the
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In
this ruling, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should
not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained
by officers acting in reasonable reliance on
a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate but ultimately found to
be invalid.49
If the court finds that an officer did not
act in good faith or that the warrant was not
particularized, the warrant’s validity could be
called into question. These issues came under
the scrutiny of the courts in recent cases related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) Playpen investigation.
In August, 2014, the dark net site, Playpen
was launched to distribute child pornography
and offering advice on grooming and avoiding
detection. Within a month, Playpen had over
60,000 registered users, with an average of
11,000 visits per week. In January 2015, the
FBI seized the server hosting the site, which
was located in Lenoir, North Carolina. The
FBI did not immediately shut down the site.
Instead, the FBI obtained a search warrant that authorized them to run the site
48
49

Gray, "A Right to Go Dark,", 668.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984).
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as a honeypot from February 20, 2015, to
March 4, 2015. This was Operation Pacifier.
The purpose of the honeypot50 was for the
FBI to deploy a Network Investigative Tool
(NIT). The FBI used the NIT pursuant to a
warrant it obtained from a magistrate judge
in the Eastern District of Virginia (the NIT
warrant).51
Once a user requested a download of child
pornography from the Playpen site, the NIT
sent the user’s computer a piece of code. That
piece of code returned the following information to law enforcement: the requesting computer’s actual IP address and the date and
time that the NIT requested this information;
a unique identifier for that particular requesting computer; the type of operating system
running on the computer; the requesting computer’s Host Name (i.e., "Fred’s Computer”);
the requesting computer’s username; and the
requesting computer’s media access control
(MAC) address.
Based on the information obtained from
the NIT, law enforcement obtained a valid
search warrant based on probable cause
that the individual was actively engaged in
the possession and/or distribution of child
pornography. As a result of Operation Pacifier, one of those arrested was Alex Levin. On
a subsequent warrant, the FBI searched Alex
Levin’s home in Norwood, Massachusetts, on
September 17, 2015. Finding images and
videos containing child pornography, Levin
was indicted and charged with possession of
child pornography. Levin immediately moved
to suppress the evidence obtained from the
NIT warrant and the subsequent warrant issued in Massachusetts.
In a potentially devastating ruling for the
government, the United States District Court
50

A honeypot website is meant to capture users
that are attracted to the illicit content that site may
provide.
51
United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 317 (1st
Cir. Oct. 27, 2017).
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for the District of Massachusetts granted
Levin’s motion. Citing United States v.
Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2015), the
court ruled that “since the warrant purported
to authorize a search of property located outside the federal judicial district where the
issuing judge sat, the NIT warrant was issued without jurisdiction and thus was void
ab initio.” 5253 They further ruled that the
resulting search was invalid since the magistrate was not authorized to issue the NIT
warrant. The good faith exception did not apply because the court found the NIT warrant
to be void ab initio. The government appealed this ruling to the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Amid the challenges in court to the NIT
warrant by Levin and others, the U.S.
Supreme Court amended Rule 41(b) that addresses the venue for a warrant application.
On February 20, 2015, when the NIT Warrant was issued, Rule 41(b)(1) stated that
At the request of a federal law enforcement
officer or an attorney for the government: (1)
a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably available, a
judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a warrant to
search for and seize a person or property located within the district.54
This meant that a magistrate could only
sign search warrants associated with suspected crimes in the territory covered by
the district in which they operated. Clearly,
many of the suspects arrested in connection
with the Playpen case lived outside of the
Eastern District of Virginia, where the NIT
52

United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35
(D. Mass., Apr. 20, 2016)
53
The term void ab initio means "to be treated as
invalid from the outset"
54
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, C.F.R.
(2018). Accessed October 1, 2020. https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/criminalrules-procedure-dec2017_0.pdf, 53.
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warrant was approved. The change to Rule
41(b) approved by Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court in April 2016, added the following language:
41(b)(6) a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related
to a crime may have occurred has authority
to issue a warrant to use remote access to
search electronic storage media and to seize
or copy electronically stored information located within or outside that district if: (A)
the district where the media or information
is located has been concealed through technological means.55
The U.S. Department of Justice supported
the amendment to Rule 41(b) because they
believed that “technology should not create a
lawless zone merely because a procedural rule
has not kept up with the times.” 56 Department officials insisted that the amendment
did not change any of the requirements under the Fourth Amendment for establishing
probable cause in an application for a warrant. Rather, the new amendment would do
“what the Rules were always intended to do:
identify a judge who can consider whether to
grant or deny a warrant application.” 57
On October 27, 2017, the First Circuit
panel reversed the District Court’s findings
in their entirety. With regard to the particularity of the NIT warrant, the panel found
that it “clearly specifies that only activating
computers – that is "those of any user . . .
who logs into [Playpen] by entering a username and password"58 – are to be searched.
55

Id, 53.
Leslie R. Caldwell, "Ensuring Tech-Savvy Criminals Do Not Have Immunity from Investigation,"
DoJ - Office of Public Affairs (blog), entry posted
November 21, 2016, accessed September 8, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/
ensuring-tech-savvy-criminals-do-not-haveimmunity-investigation.
57
Id.
58
United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323 (1st
Cir. 2017).
56
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The NIT warrant specifies into which homes
an intrusion is permitted (those where the
activating computers are located), and on
what basis (that the users in those homes
logged into Playpen).” 59
Finding that the executing officers acted
in good faith, the panel further concluded
that the “warrant, in this case, was particular enough to infer that, in executing it,
the [executing officers] act[ed] with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their
conduct [was] lawful.” 60 According to Shepard’s61 , United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316,
(1st Cir. 2017) has been followed or cited
in 48 separate subsequent cases.62 However,
questions remain regarding the scope and
particularity of NIT warrants used in online
investigations.
3.3.1

Rule 41 – Procedural or
Substantial Changes?

The debate among scholars concerning Rule
41 (b) is centered on whether the changes
to Rule 41 (b) were merely procedural or
whether those changes substantially affected
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure. There are
strong opinions on both sides of the debate.
Hennessey (2017) contends that NITs are
a necessary part of child exploitation investigations because “successful lawful hacking
can lead to the identification of offenders and
the rescue of child victims, . . . reduce
the sense of security and comfort offenders
feel in accessing and distributing child sexual abuse materials, . . . and should be
59

Id, 323
Id, 323.
61
Shepard’s Citations is a citator used in United
States legal research that provides a list of all the
authorities citing a particular case, statute, or other
legal authority.
62
Followed means to conform to or comply with
the ruling being cited. Cited by makes reference to
the previous ruling for the purpose of making a legal
point in a finding.
60
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targeted at dismantling offender communities that proliferate on hidden services and
other platforms.” 63 She further contends that
the NIT Warrant was supported by probable
cause because “the NIT was deployed only
upon the completed crime of accessing the
contraband image.” 64
Mercke (2018) likewise says the changes
in Rule 41 (b) because they “were necessary in order to fix the glaring venue problems that cybercrimes caused for law enforcement and the courts . . . it merely
allows magistrate judges to apply [Fourth
Amendment] principles to an expanded digital realm.” 65 Hennessey similarly supports
this position, stating that “we are now in
the far more desirable situation of having a
clear mechanism by which law enforcement
can seek a warrant—subject to constitutional
constraints—as opposed to the prior circumstances whereby law enforcement was unable
to obtain a warrant even where it was clearly
constitutionally permissible.” 66
Ohm (2017) contends that the changes to
Rule 41 were principally valuable to conducting online investigations because “at least
in police investigations of crimes occurring
online, almost every new investigative lead
comes bundled with probable cause. Unlike
the physical world, the online world tends
not to produce evidence that seems somewhat suspicious but not enough to establish
probable cause, which means that we should
no longer think of probable cause as the only
63

Susan Hennessey, The Elephant in the Room:
Addressing Child Exploitation and Going Dark, Aegis
Paper Series 1701 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution,
2017), 12.
64
Hennessey, The Elephant, 19.
65
Bryan Mercke, "Dicing the Onion: An Analysis
of Trans-Jurisdictional Warrants regarding Anonymous Cyber Crimes," University of Louisville Law
Review 56, no. 3 (2018): 458.
66
Hennessey, The Elephant, 16.
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tool with which we protected ourselves from
unfettered police investigations.” 67
Those observers that believe that the
changes to Rule 41 were substantial in nature hold equally strong opinions. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (2016) contends
that “the rules and proposals are supposed to
be procedural and must not change substantive rights. But the amendment to Rule 41
isn’t procedural at all. It creates new avenues
for government hacking that Congress never
approved.” 68
Lerner (2016) contends that the changes to
Rule 41 make it less likely that NIT warrant
will be supported by probable cause because
“it is unlikely that the government can demonstrate that the information seized from each
person that visits a website throughout the
surveillance period will be related to the investigation. While there may be some websites
for which access alone may violate the law
- such as a website that upon visitation disseminates child pornography to the user - the
vast majority of websites will be frequented
by legitimate users for whom probable cause
does not exist.” 69
Russell (2017) argues that the changes to
Rule 41 remove the procedures that safeguard
against unreasonable search and seizure saying that “the substantial provisions of the
Fourth Amendment serve as the only bar be67

Paul Ohm, "The Investigative Dynamics of the
Use of Malware by Law Enforcement," William Mary
Bill of Rights Journal 26, no. 2 (December 2017):
305.
68
Electronic Frontier Foundation, "With Rule 41,
Little-Known Committee Proposes to Grant
New Hacking Powers to the Government,"
Electronic Frontier Foundation, last modified April 30, 2016, accessed August 31, 2020,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/rule41-little-known-committee-proposes-grantnew-hacking-powers-government.
69
Zack Lerner, "A Warrant to Hack: An Analysis
of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal Ruled of Criminal Procedure," Yale Journal of
Law and Technology 18 (2016): 48.
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tween residents of the Western District of
Texas being hacked into by FBI agents in the
Eastern District of Virginia based solely on
a magistrate’s review.” 70
The Fourth Amendment requires that
search warrants specify with particularity
who is to be searched, where that search is to
occur, and what may be seized as part of that
search. Whether NIT warrants meet the particularity requirements for search warrants
under the Fourth Amendment is another area
of debate among scholars.
Referring to the FBI’s Playpen investigation that sparked the debate on NIT warrants,
Lerner (2016) says that since “the government
is unable to articulate either the location of
the device to be searched or its IP address,
there is reason to doubt the government’s ability to meet the particularity requirement.” 71
He is also concerned that the lack of particularity makes NIT warrants akin to general
warrants because they “need only specify that
a given suspect has or will use the Internet to
receive, store, or transmit evidence relevant
to criminal activity.” 72
Rauschecker (2017) asserts that the
changes to Rule 41 make it less likely that
NIT warrants will lack particularity because
“even if the government is able to demonstrate
probable cause, it must no longer clearly identify the location of a computer to be searched,
and it may use a single warrant to search
thousands or even millions of computers.” 73
Some scholars contend that particularity
requirements may be set aside when NITs are
70

Zoe Russell, "First They Came for the Child
Pornographers: The FBI’s International Search Warrant to Hack the Dark Web," St. Mary’s Law Journal
49, no. 1 (2017): 309.
71
Lerner, "A Warrant," 49.
72
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deployed to investigate the sharing of child
pornography via websites on the dark web.
While society agrees that this type of crime
deserves all that technology can bring to bear
to defeat, some observers are concerned that
NITs may be used to pursue websites that
have nothing to do with child pornography.
Adams (2017) states that “regardless of
the crime being investigated, courts must be
cautious about the precedent set regarding
how broadly the FBI can use NIT technology,
[because] “this tactic could easily be utilized
on more benign websites.” 74 Also questioning how broadly NITs are deployed, Aucoin
(2018) concludes that “one person may easily
draw a line for sex offenders, specifically child
predators, while the next person may easily
do the same for non-violent drug offenders.
Whose line prevails here?” 75
The third area of comment from legal scholars concerns the changes that might be necessary to ensure that future searches conducted under NIT warrants comply with the
Fourth Amendment. To avoid claims of dubious probable cause on searches of websites
with mixed legal and illegal content, Merke
(2018) states that “NITs should only be activated when the accessing computer navigates
to pages on the website that contain illicit
content.” 76 Lerner (2016) calls for more strict
oversight, including “satisfying a preliminary
showing that the location of the concealed
device cannot reasonably be ascertained without an extraterritorial remote access search;
requiring a thorough and technical descrip74

Devin M. Adams, "The 2016 Amendments to
Criminal Rule 41: National Search Warrants to Seize
Cyberspace, Particularly Speaking," University of
Richmond Law Review 51, no. 3 (March 2017): 762.
75
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tion of both the search tool’s installation process and location collection method; and mandating the implementation and description
of minimization and accountability measures
to limit harm.” 77
Other observers argue that the deployment of NITs should be restricted to known
websites hosting illicit content. In those instances, Adams (2017) says that the government “should reasonably limit the scope
and probability of ensnaring those stumbling
upon the site by planting the NIT code, not
on the home page, but further within the
website so that an individual’s happenstance
encounter with the site does not trigger the
search.” 78
Calling for more supervisory oversight and
review, Daskal (2016) argues that such reviews “should demand rigorous and periodic
security reviews by both internal and independent experts of the tools being employed.” 79 Ohm (2017) contends that legislation is needed, saying that “Congress could
enact a new law, for example, perhaps modeled on the Wiretap Act - necessity, internal
review, and predicate crimes, that required
more than the baseline requirements of probable cause and review by a detached and
neutral magistrate before the police could be
granted a warrant to deploy [NITs].” 80
Finally, some claim that the potential
abuses of power are too dangerous for NITs
to be deployed at all. As one observer
noted, “Courts have said that dangerous tools
used to effectuate otherwise lawful searches
— tools like flashbang grenades and battering rams — can be unreasonable under the
77
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Fourth Amendment. Government malware is
another such tool. Some investigative techniques are just too dangerous to use.” 81 To
date, there has been no legislative debate as
to whether the change to Rule 41 was procedural (i.e., what a magistrate can authorize
and under what conditions), or whether it
was substantial (i.e., a change to the Fourth
Amendment that allows for the conditional
use of general warrants).

3.4

Geo-Fence Warrants

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right
of citizens to be secure in their persons from
all unreasonable searches and seizures. In
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
the United States Supreme Court redefined
what constitutes a search and seizure by instituting the Katz test for the reasonable
expectation of privacy. The two-part test
states that “first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.” ” 82
The introduction of new technologies continues to pose challenges for the courts to determine what constitutes a search and seizure
and how to apply the Katz test for a reasonable expectation of privacy. The use of
geo-location by law enforcement in tracking
potential suspects’ movements is one of those
technologies challenging the courts.
In Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206 (June 22, 2018), the Supreme Court set
a precedent with regard to geo-fence warrants.
Timothy Carpenter was arrested along with
three other men in April 2011 after a lengthy
investigation by Detroit police department
into a string of unsolved robberies at local
81

Plus Media Solutions, "Challenging Government
Hacking: What’s at Stake," US Official News (London, UK), November 2, 2017.
82
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T-Mobile and Radio Shack stores. The four
men were subsequently charged with aiding
and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery and various related weapons charges.83 One of the
men arrested confessed to the robberies and
provided detectives with his cell phone number and the cell phone numbers of others
involved in the robberies.
From this information, detectives applied
for a geo-fence warrant to obtain transactional information from several wireless carriers for “all subscriber information, toll records
and call detail records including listed and
unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from [the] target telephones
from December 1, 2010, to present, as well as
cell site information for the target telephones
at call origination and at call termination for
incoming and outgoing calls.” 84 Along with
his co-defendants, Carpenter was ultimately
charged with six Hobbs Act violations.
At trial, the government introduced evidence that demonstrated “that each man
used his cellphone within a half-mile to two
miles of several robberies during the times
the robberies occurred.” 85 The defendants
challenged the collection of the cell service
provider’s records from the geo-fence warrant,
arguing that the collection of those records
constituted a warrantless search, violating
the Fourth Amendment. The district court
denied the motion, and Carpenter was convicted and sentenced to serve 1,395 months.
Carpenter then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
challenging the district court’s denial of their
motion to suppress the cell service provider
records. Those records included cell-site lo83

The Hobbs Act (1946) prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or
foreign commerce in any way or degree.
84
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85
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cation information, covering 127 consecutive
days of records.
In denying Carpenter’s appeal, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that “government’s collection of
business records containing cell-site data was
not a search under the Fourth Amendment,
and suppression of evidence was not among
the remedies available for alleged violations
of the Stored Communications Act.” 8687
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice
Stranch sounded a warning when he wrote: “I
am also concerned about the applicability of
a test that appears to admit to no limitation
on the quantity of records or the length of
time for which such records may be compelled.
I conclude that our precedent suggests the
need to develop a new test to determine when
a warrant may be necessary under these or
comparable circumstances.” 88
The stage was set for Carpenter to take his
appeal to the Supreme Court. On November
29, 2017, the court heard arguments from the
plaintiff and the government’s attorneys. Justice Roberts described the stakes at hand, saying, “this case presents the question whether
the Government conducts a search under the
Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” 89
On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Carpenter, saying that “government’s acquisition from wireless carriers
of defendant’s historical cell-site location information (CSLI) was a search under the
Fourth Amendment.” 90 Going further, the

court ruled that when “the government accessed defendant’s CSLI, it invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of
his physical movements, and the fact that the
government obtained the information from
a third party did not overcome defendant’s
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.” 91
Finally, the court determined that a search
warrant was required for the government to
obtain cell-site location information (CSLI).
In making their ruling, the court clarified
Fourth Amendment protections and the reasonable expectation of privacy for the digital
age. In so doing, the court also recognized
that their ruling was narrow – that there may
be exigent circumstances that demand obtaining CSLI in the absence of a search warrant.
What those circumstances may have yet to
be fully determined.
Since the Supreme Court ruling in Carpenter, the Ninth Circuit ruled that that “CSLI
acquired pre-Carpenter is admissible — so
long as the Government satisfied the SCA’s
then-lawful requirements — under Krull’s
good-faith exception.” 92 This would appear
to make moot any future appeals that come
before the U.S. Courts of Appeal on matters
related to pre-Carpenter CSLI data.
3.4.1

Search and Seizure and the
Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy

The debate over law enforcement’s use of
geo-fence warrants to investigate crimes and
identify suspects is concerned with the following questions:

86
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• Are geo-fence search warrants particularized to the extent that they are not
general warrants?
91

Id, 2220.
United States v. Korte, 918 F.3d 750, 759 (9th
Cir. 2019), citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107
S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
92
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• Should a search warrant supported by
probable cause be required for any geofence search warrant?
• Is CSLI data reliable? If not, should it
be admitted as evidence?
• Finally, should law enforcement agencies skirt the Carpenter ruling by buying
CSLI data from private companies?
Citing concerns about the scope of geofence warrants, in 2019, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) said that “most of the
information provided to law enforcement in
response to a geo-fence warrant does not pertain to individuals suspected of the crime .
. . search results are both over and under
inclusive . . .and the user’s Google identifies
in response to a geo-fence warrant may not
even be within the geographic area defined
by the warrant (and therefore are outside the
scope of the warrant).” 93 Also concerned with
the particularity of these warrants, the EFF
stated that they “lack particularity because
they don’t properly and specifically describe
an account or a person’s data to be seized.
They result in overbroad searches that can
ensnare countless people with no connection
to the crime.” 94
Geo-fence warrants obtained under the
Stored Communications Act do not require
notification to the targets of electronic of
surveillance. Bloch-Wehba (2020) contends
that “secrecy threatens to undermine the effectiveness of checks on law enforcement because the public lacks any real opportunity
93
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to mobilize against abusive practices.” 95 According to her, public scrutiny of geo-fence
warrants is necessary as a response to “warrantless surveillance at scale.” 96
Priester (2019) adds to the discussion of
warrantless seizure at scale, observing that
“data-driven surveillance allows the Government to gather vastly greater quantities of
information about a person than has ever
been possible before . . . and data-driven
surveillance also provides the Government
with information of a very different qualitative nature than has ever existed previously.” 97
The lack of particularity in geo-fence warrants concerns scholars like Elm (2020), who
observes that “innocent bystanders may have
their personal information sucked up by police in wholesale ways that wouldn’t have
happened before the ubiquity of internet
connected smartphones.” 98 Because of this,
Elm says that police should restrict the use
of geo-fence to more serious, violent crimes
and clearly detail the probable cause upon
which their search warrant is based. Elm argues that even in these instances “the Fourth
Amendment prohibits police from going doorto-door to search innocent households for the
suspect, so the ‘general warrant’ and the Particularity Clause ultimately may put an end
to these warrants.” 99
Finally, some scholars contend that using
historical cell site location information (CSLI)
is unreliable and should be ruled as inadmis95
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sible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence (the Daubert Test). Kirkham
(2019) observes that the coverage maps created by service provider “were not created for
location-tracking purposes, but for internal
business decisions of the cellular company.” 100
He says that although service providers have
business reasons for collecting CSLI, “none of
those reasons involve historical location tracking of a cell phone. Only law enforcement
employs [CLSI] for that purpose.” 101 An additional problem with geo-fence warrant is a
loophole in Carpenter that has led some law
enforcement agencies to exploit by buying
location data from private companies rather
than applying for a warrant to search cell
phone carrier records as required by Carpenter. According to Cushing (2020) , “federal
agencies are going to want this loophole kept
open. Since it’s unlikely the government is informing courts about this use of data, there
have been no courtroom challenges of this
practice, leaving the feds free to operate in
this precedent-free void.” 102 He concludes by
saying that although federal agencies “are
playing to the edges of the Fourth Amendment right now and it might come back to
hurt them.” 103

3.5

Referencing the discussion on the legal landscape, we see the following results. Of the
112 cases included in this study, fifty-seven
(50.89%) were related to the areas of jurisprudence discussed in the first section of this
study. Five were related to border searches,
one was related to compelled decryption,
twenty-eight were related to geo-fence warrants, and twenty-three were related to NIT
warrants. There are myriad reasons for this.
For compelled decryption, it is likely that
these types of appeals will make their way to
the U.S. Courts of Appeal but are currently
in the State court system or are in the federal
district court system. In some instances, appeals were made but dismissed because the
defendant had no standing to appeal (i.e.,
the objection was not made or preserved at
trial). With regard to border searches, and
compelled decryption, it is possible that certain defendants are waiting for the Supreme
Court to made a decision on those areas of jurisprudence before submitting their appeals.
Of the appeals that were related to the
areas of jurisprudence discussed, only one
resulted in a decision that favored the defendant. The next section highlights that
appeal.
3.5.1
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Appeals Related to the
Legal Landscape

United States v. Cano, 934 F.
3rd 1002 (9th Cir. 2019)

On July 25, 2016, Miguel Cano was arrested
shortly after arriving at the San Ysidro Port
of Entry from Tijuana. Cano’s vehicle was
diverted to a secondary inspection following
a random Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) agency computer referral. During this
secondary inspection, CBP dogs detected the
presence of narcotics in the vehicle’s spare
tire. Upon inspection, CBP agents found
over 30 pounds of cocaine inside fourteen
vacuum-sealed packages.
© 2022 JDFSL
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Cano was subsequently arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking, and his cell phone
was seized. After a brief manual inspection of
the cell phone, CBP agents conducted an invasive secondary search. This search included
using the cell phone forensics tool, Cellebrite,
to conduct a logical download of the phone’s
contents. The logical download yielded text
messages, contacts, call logs, and any media
contained on the phone.
Miguel Cano was later indicted for importing cocaine. During his evidentiary hearing,
Cano moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the initial manual search and
the subsequent invasive search conducted using Cellebrite. The court denied the motion
to suppress, ruling that both the initial and
subsequent searches were subject to the border exception for searches.
After a mistrial, Cano was convicted following his second trial for importing cocaine.
On April 27, 2017, Cano was committed to
the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for
a term of 54 months. Miguel Cano appealed
his conviction to the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals.
In considering Cano’s appeal, the court addressed the following issues: 1) whether any
warrantless search of a cell phone falls outside the scope of the border search exception;
2) if the search is within the scope of the
border search exception, whether a warrantless cell phone search is so intrusive that it
requires probable cause; 3) even if cell phones
are generally subject to search at the border,
whether the manual and forensic searches
Cano’s cell phone exceeded the scope of the
border search; and 4) if the search was conducted in good faith, whether the evidence
should nevertheless be admissible104 .
The panel from the 9th Circuit determined
that cell phones are subject to search at the
104

United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2019).
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border, declaring that “manual searches of cell
phones at the border are reasonable without
individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic
examination of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.” 105 Therefore,
Cano’s cell phone was subject to a search.
In considering whether a warrantless search
of a cell phone is so intrusive as to require
probable cause, the panel held that “that
manual searches of cell phones at the border
are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination of a
cell phone requires a showing of reasonable
suspicion.” 106
In determining whether the manual and
forensic searches of Cano’s cell phone exceeded the scope of the border search, the
panel concluded that “that border officials
may conduct a forensic cell phone search only
when they reasonably suspect that the cell
phone to be searched itself contains contraband.” 107
Concluding that CBP agents did not have
reasonable suspicion, then “the Cellebrite
search of Cano’s cell phone qualifies as a
forensic search, the entire search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 108
In their final word on the matter, the court
held that “the border search exception did
not authorize the agents to conduct a warrantless forensic search of Cano’s phone, and
evidence obtained through a forensic search
should be suppressed.” 109
The panel from the 9th Circuit determined
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Referring to their
ruling in United States v. Cotterman, 709
F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), the panel said
that “Cotterman was a search for contraband
that the government has a right to seize at
105
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the border. Here, the officials’ search was
objectively tied only to proving their case
against Cano and finding evidence of future
crimes. Searching for evidence and searching
for contraband is not the same thing.” 110
The panel from the 9th Circuit reversed
the District Court’s denying Cano’s motion
for suppression and vacated his conviction.
There has been no subsequent court action
related to Miguel Cano.

4.

LIMITATIONS

This study examined appeals of in criminal
cases before the United States Courts of Appeal, focusing on significant areas of jurisprudence affecting decisions made in appeals involving some aspect of digital evidence. The
author is a program manager with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), an agency
of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
Justice Programs. Part of NIJ’s mission is
to provide objective and independent knowledge and tools to inform the decision-making
of the criminal and juvenile justice communities to reduce crime and advance justice.
As such civil matters were not considered for
inclusion in this study. It may be worthwhile
for future researchers to examine how digital
evidence fares in civil matters before the U.S.
Courts of Appeal.
Additionally, the appeals included in this
study resulted from searches executed within
Lexus Advance. Accordingly, examining the
potential bias of the jurists or deciphering
the mind of jurists was outside the scope of
the current study.
Finally, the search terms used may have
missed some appeals involving digital evidence. However, the author is confident that
the issues raised herein were adequately represented by the cases cited.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

In the previous study’s conclusions, it was
suggested that digital evidence from wearable
Internet of Things devices would make its way
into the United States Courts of Appeal. It
should be noted that no cases came before the
United States Courts of Appeal that involved
digital evidence derived from the Internet of
Things between 2016 and 2020. However,
that may soon change.
In 2016, evidence from a Fitbit was used
to exonerate a suspect in the murder of his
wife in Wisconsin 111 . In that same case,
location evidence from a Google Dashboard
application helped convict the perpetrator.
In 2018, digital evidence from a pacemaker
helped detectives charge a suspect accused of
committing arson by setting his own dwelling
ablaze 112 .
While the Internet of Things may well be
the coming storm, the digital evidence associated with criminal cases before the United
States Courts of Appeal from 2016 to 2020
came from an assortment of computers, laptops, cell phones, and GPS-enabled devices.
The areas of jurisprudence discussed in
section three have profound implications for
decisions made in appeals of criminal cases
before the United States Courts of Appeal.
Those decisions affect how police conduct investigations, what evidence a prosecutor may
choose to introduce at trial, and how likely
that evidence will be considered admissible
in court.
Citizens will still be subject to searches at
the nation’s borders. Investigators will still
need to unlock digital devices to uncover potential evidence. Law enforcement will still
need to deploy unique methods to catch criminals hiding behind the dark web’s anonymity.
Furthermore, finally, investigators will still
111
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need to determine the whereabouts of potential suspects in criminal investigations. How
these actions are all accomplished will spark
continued debate among scholars and ensure
a steady stream of decisions handed down in
the U.S. Courts of Appeal that may be definitive, occasionally contradictory, and always
noteworthy.
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